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Abstract For most of human history children have been a byproduct of sex rather 
than a conscious choice by parents to create people with traits that they care about. 
As our understanding of genetics advances along with our ability to control repro-
duction and manipulate genes, prospective parents have stronger moral reasons to 
consider how their choices are likely to affect their children, and how their children 
are likely to affect other people. With the advent of cheap and effective contracep-
tion, and the emergence of new technologies for in vitro fertilization, embryo selec-
tion, and genetic engineering, it is becoming increasingly difficult to justify rolling 
the genetic dice by having children without thinking about the traits they will have. 
It is time to face up to the awesome responsibilities that accompany our reproductive 
choices.
Keywords Eugenics · Embryo Selection · Genetic Engineering · Liberal Eugenics
1 Introduction
The title of this essay is deliberately provocative. Eugenics can be thought of as any 
attempt to harness the power of reproduction to produce people with traits that ena-
ble them to thrive. Nearly everyone agrees that parents should provide an environ-
ment that promotes the welfare of their children. Advocates of eugenics add that 
we should also manipulate biology to promote well-being, provided we can do so 
without imposing undue risk on our children or on other people with whom they 
will share the planet.
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Defending eugenics 
In defending eugenics, I want to reclaim the spirit of authors like Francis Galton 
and Charles Darwin, who believed that our reproductive obligations change with our 
understanding of biology and our capacity to control it. Defending eugenics does not 
commit us to endorsing state-sponsored coercion, nor to the parochial views held 
by some advocates of eugenics in the early twentieth century. Likewise, defend-
ing eugenics does not commit us to genetic determinism, according to which genes 
determine every important aspect of our personality. No credible scientist believes 
this (Sesardic 2005). Rather, the scientific consensus is that virtually every trait that 
influences our personality and our likelihood of living a good life—including intel-
ligence, health, empathy, and impulse control—has a substantial genetic component 
(Bouchard 2004; Polderman et al. 2015; Plomin et al. 2016).
I’ll begin with an overview of the problem that motivates eugenics, then describe 
the widely shared moral principles to which eugenicists have appealed. I’ll end with 
tentative policy proposals that aim to reverse current dysgenic trends, and increase 
the extent to which our reproductive choices produce future people who thrive.
2  Demographic trends
Reproductive choices constitute a massive intergenerational collective action prob-
lem.1 In nearly every developed country in the world people who are well-suited to 
have children have relatively low birth rates, yet future people would be better off if 
people with heritable traits that we value had a greater proportion of children. The 
collective action problem that reproductive choices create is much harder to solve 
than anthropogenic climate change, antibiotic resistance, and other problems with a 
similar structure. It is also much more dangerous to try to solve. Charles Darwin rec-
ognized the problem of dysgenic reproductive trends and the perils of possible solu-
tions.2 His cousin Francis Galton, a polymath who founded the eugenics movement, 
shared Darwin’s diagnosis but was more optimistic about solutions.3
Darwin argued that social welfare programs for the poor and sick are a natural 
expression of our sympathy, but also a danger to future populations if they encour-
age people with serious congenital diseases and heritable traits like low levels of 
impulse control, intelligence, or empathy to reproduce at higher rates than other 
people in the population.4 Darwin feared that in developed nations “the reckless, 
1 I elaborate on this claim in an earlier essay (Anomaly 2014).
2 By “dysgenic” I mean the proliferation of people with traits that are detrimental to human welfare. An 
example would be a trait like sadism, psychopathy, or extremely low intelligence.
3 Though Galton’s project was not new. In the Republic, Socrates asks Glaucon “if care was not taken 
in their breeding, your dogs and birds would greatly deteriorate, right?” Glaucon agrees, and Socrates 
continues, “the best men must have intercourse with the best women as frequently as possible, and the 
opposite is true of the very inferior.” Republic, 459e, first published around 380 BCE.
4 A similar worry that Darwin could not have understood is the problem of “mutational meltdown” first 
explored by Hermann Muller, and discussed by evolutionary biologist John Tooby (2016). The problem 
is that without the brutal checks of natural selection, mutation load tends to increase across generations.
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degraded, and often vicious members of society, tend to increase at a quicker rate 
than the provident and generally virtuous members” (Darwin 1882, p. 138).5
While Darwin’s language is shocking to contemporary readers, we should take 
him seriously. The eugenics programs implemented in Nazi Germany are probably 
the main reason most people no longer acknowledge that there might be some truth 
to Darwin’s worries. Indeed, because of the racist direction the eugenics movement 
took in the United States and Germany, many academics after World War II began 
to deny that races exist, that genes matter, and that intelligence or impulse control 
are heritable traits that help predict the relative success of different people or groups 
(Pinker 2002; Cofnas 2016).
As Steven Pinker argues in the context of individual and group differences in 
intelligence, “in recent decades, the standard response to claims of genetic differ-
ences has been to deny the existence of intelligence, to deny the existence of races 
and other genetic groupings, and to subject proponents to vilification, censorship, 
and at times physical intimidation” (2006). These are understandable over-reactions 
to the morally abhorrent policies and pseudo-scientific claims—often couched in the 
language of eugenics—that led to the Holocaust.
It is striking that in addition to being racist and cruel, Nazi policies had dysgenic 
effects. Hitler’s attempt to exterminate Ashkenazi Jews—arguably among the most 
intelligent and productive people of the twentieth century6—was not only morally 
outrageous, but contrary to what any reasonable eugenics program would hope to 
achieve: to produce future people with qualities that we value, including intelligence 
and creativity. A truly eugenic program might have encouraged Jews to breed more, 
not less. Hitler’s own vision seems to come from the scientifically erroneous view 
that there is a “struggle for existence” between races (a frequently misused phrase 
borrowed from Darwin), and that by virtue of their relative success, European Jews 
threatened the existence or prosperity of Germans. Hitler’s rise to power came not 
because of his scientific acumen, but in part because of his ability to scapegoat an 
especially successful group, and because of the tragic human tendency to commit 
the zero-sum fallacy (according to which, if one group has more wealth or success, 
they must have taken it from other groups, rather than adding to the stock of social 
5 Darwin expresses some uncertainty whether this is true in contemporary Britain, but concludes that “If 
the various checks [of infectious disease, starvation, and involuntary celibacy] do not prevent the reck-
less, the vicious and otherwise inferior members of society from increasing at a quicker rate than the bet-
ter class of men, the nation will retrograde, as has occurred too often in the history of the world. We must 
remember that progress is no invariable rule” (1882, p. 140).
6 Informal evidence for this claim comes from the success of Jews around the world even in the presence 
of social and legal discrimination, and from the percentage of Nobel prizes and other scientific acco-
lades Jews were awarded in the twentieth century. More rigorous evidence comes from the heritability 
of IQ scores (Ashkenazi IQ is the highest in the world, nearly two standard deviations above the global 
average). For more on the evolution of Ashkenazi intelligence, See Cochran et al. (2006), Cochran and 
Harpending (2009, ch. 7), and Wade (2014, ch. 8).
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value).7 We should continue to learn from this episode in history, but stop allowing 
it to silence any discussion of the merits of eugenic thinking.
In fact, there is increasingly good evidence that Darwin was right to worry about 
demographic trends in developed countries. The evidence is sparse because many 
people who pursue this research have a hard time getting it funded or published, 
due to common worries that it will resurrect racism, classism, and intolerant forms 
of eugenics. But evidence exists. For example, a number of authors have found a 
negative correlation between IQ and fertility,8 between education and fertility, and, 
independently, between income and fertility—especially in developed countries 
with robust welfare states and increased opportunities for ambitious and intelligent 
women.9 The problem is exacerbated by the fact that people with more education 
and income (correlated with higher intelligence), tend not only to have fewer chil-
dren but also tend to delay reproduction in the pursuit of other goals.
This is consistent with Hermann Muller’s observation that “it is not the having of 
children but the prevention of them which today requires the more active, responsi-
ble effort, an effort which makes demands on the participants’ prudence, initiative, 
skill, and conscience” (1963, p. 253). By contrast, Muller maintains, “persons pos-
sessed of greater foresight, and those with keener regard for their family, usually 
aim to have a lower than average number of children, in order that they may obtain 
higher benefits for those children that they do have, as well as for themselves and 
those near to them.” (1963, p. 254).
The demographic pattern Muller identified is partly explained by the high oppor-
tunity cost of having children in societies in which successful parents can pursue 
other goals (Becker 1981). Another explanation is that when especially successful 
people have fewer children, other ambitious people emulate them (Richerson and 
Boyd 2005, ch. 5). For example, it is increasingly common for ambitious and com-
passionate career women to choose to have pets rather than children, or to adopt chil-
dren in middle age rather than having their own. This trend may have good effects 
on the adopted children in the short run but bad effects on the gene pool over the 
long run. Substituting cats for kids, or devoting one’s career to caring for other peo-
ple’s kids while foregoing reproduction oneself, may be an example of pathological 
altruism (Oakley 2012). This occurs when pro-social emotions that were adaptive in 
7 As Nicholas Wade points out, “Like Chinese immigrant communities, Jews have brought enormous 
benefits to the economies in which they worked. Unfortunately their success, like that of the immigrant 
Chinese, has in many cases elicited not gratitude but envy, followed by discrimination or murderous 
reprisals, a response that reflects more strongly on the greed than the intelligence of their host popula-
tions” (2014, p. 213).
8 Demographers use “fertility” to refer to the number of children people choose to have, not their capac-
ity to have children.
9 See for example Teasdale and Owen (2008), Meisenberg (2009, 2010), and Lynn and Harvey (2008). 
Intelligence researchers acknowledge the so-called Flynn effect, which refers to the rise in IQ throughout 
the world due to environmental improvements like clean water and nutrition, but argue that in devel-
oped countries these are already exhausted or near exhaustion, so that the genetic component of IQ may 
be sinking even as the environmental component has risen. I should emphasize that IQ is an imperfect 
measure of intelligence, and that intelligence is not the only thing that matters. An intelligent sadist 
makes him more dangerous rather than more admirable.
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ancestral environments produce behavior that is either counter-adaptive or leads to 
its own long-run reduction in modern environments.
Whatever the evidence for dysgenic trends in developed countries, Francis Gal-
ton tried to show in his book Hereditary Genius (1869) that qualities we care about 
tend to run in families, and that changing the norms surrounding reproduction could 
dramatically improve the human population in the same way artificial selection can 
improve domesticated animals.10 Galton’s followers included playwright George 
Bernard Shaw, novelist HG Wells, and the evolutionary biologist JBS Haldane.11 
At the turn of the twentieth century, an increasing number of influential intellectuals 
sought to promote education about heredity and shape social norms so that women 
would be encouraged to carefully choose the fathers of their children. Some of the 
more fervent eugenicists, many of whom overestimated their understanding of the 
relevant science, began to promote statutes that would allow states to involuntarily 
sterilize citizens deemed unfit for reproduction. The first eugenic sterilization law 
was passed in Indiana in 1907. By the time Virginia passed a similar law in 1924, it 
was following the lead of 15 other American states.
3  Moral Principles
In 1927 the United States Supreme Court voted by an 8-1 margin to uphold the state 
of Virginia’s right to sterilize “feeble-minded” citizens. While the language of Buck 
v Bell may seem callous, and the evidence in the case was flimsy, the moral founda-
tions of the decision are defensible. Writing for the majority, Justice Holmes argued 
that the Virginia statute was premised on the ideas that “the health of the patient and 
the welfare of society may be promoted in certain cases by the sterilization of men-
tal defectives…without serious pain or substantial danger to life…”12 Controversial 
as this statement is, on a charitable reading, the moral principles the court high-
lights include coercing “mental defectives” (who can’t make competent choices) to 
undergo surgery only if it involves little danger or pain, and if it either makes the 
person being coerced better off, or prevents them from bearing children who are 
likely to impose significant harm on future people.
In the penultimate paragraph, Holmes compares the sacrifice of someone who is 
involuntarily sterilized with the sacrifice of soldiers drafted into war:
10 Showing that a trait runs in families was an imperfect way of showing a genetic component in an 
age before genomics. This method can still yield useful results. For example, economist Gregory Clark 
(2014) uses more sophisticated data analysis than Galton had available to try to disentangle social and 
genetic factors in explaining social mobility and success.
11 A character in Bernard Shaw’s play Man and Superman lamented that “The day is coming when the 
great nations will find their numbers dwindling from census to census; when the six-roomed villa will 
rise in price above the family mansion; when the viciously reckless poor and the stupidly pious rich will 
delay the extinction of the race only by degrading it; while the boldly prudent, the thriftily selfish and 
ambitious, the imaginative and poetic, the lovers of money and solid comfort, the worshippers of success, 
of art, and of love, will all oppose to the Force of Life the device of sterility” (1903, p. 159).
12 Buck v Bell, 274 US 200 (1927).
29
1 3
Defending eugenics 
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call upon the best 
citizens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who 
already sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt 
to be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with 
incompetence. It is better for all the world if, instead of waiting to execute 
degenerate offspring for crime or to let them starve for their imbecility, soci-
ety can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The 
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cut-
ting the Fallopian tubes.11
In the final line of the decision Justice Holmes cites an earlier case (Jacobson 
v. Massachusetts) in which the Supreme Court upheld a law that required a Swed-
ish immigrant to vaccinate his children against smallpox (despite the father’s objec-
tions) in order to prevent serious harm to the child, and through the child, other 
people.
While the language of the decision is compatible with a variety of moral theo-
ries, the core principle is that a citizen can be required to undergo a procedure if the 
cost to him is trivial compared to the social benefits. Nearly all moral theories hold 
this view, though people disagree about the magnitude and certainty of benefits we 
would need in order to justify the expected costs to the person being vaccinated, 
sterilized, or otherwise coerced. Compulsory sterilization is far more controversial 
than compulsory vaccination because of the degree of invasiveness, and the poten-
tial for abuse. Nevertheless, the following moral principles seem to be expressed in 
Buck v Bell:
1. The state may (in some cases) restrict someone’s liberty if their mental capacity 
undermines their ability to make voluntary choices, and if their choices put them 
at serious risk of causing far-reaching and irreversible harm to themselves.
2. The state may (in some cases) restrict someone’s liberty when leaving them free 
to act as they wish poses serious risks of harm to others.
3. The state may (in some cases) require us to act in ways that promote social welfare 
when we find ourselves in collective action problems in which each of us has an 
incentive to act one way, but most of us are better off if most people act in another 
way.
4. When the state has compelling reasons to coerce its citizens in accordance with 
one or more of the three principles above, it should do so in a way that restricts 
liberty least, and involves the least amount of pain or sacrifice.
 The plausibility of these principles in other contexts strongly suggests that much of 
the vehement rejection of eugenic policies after the Second World War was about 
empirical assumptions rather than moral principles. More specifically, people disa-
gree about issues like the extent of our knowledge of genetics, the safety of eugenic 
procedures, and the ability of government agents to make the right call on whether 
a particular person or group has heritable characteristics that are likely to be trans-
mitted to children who will live very bad lives, or adversely affect other people. I 
argue that we can use these moral principles to inform a more cautious approach to 
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eugenics which places more weight on individual liberty and less confidence in the 
wisdom of state agents than early manifestations of eugenics did.13 Some call this 
approach liberal eugenics (Agar 2004).
4  Policy proposals
Many people distinguish negative from positive eugenics, and coercive from non-
coercive eugenics. The idea is that negative eugenics tries to sift out undesirable 
psychological or physical characteristics (like psychopathy or Tay Sachs disease), 
while positive eugenics seeks to increase the prevalence of traits that promote indi-
vidual and social welfare (like creativity or a healthy immune system).14 Coercive 
eugenics uses force to achieve these ends, while non-coercive eugenics uses educa-
tion, information, and social norms to achieve them. The distinctions are not sharp, 
and they do not map onto what is right or wrong in any obvious way (Gyngell and 
Selgelid 2016). It is best, then, to focus on the justifiability of particular public pol-
icy proposals.
4.1  Free contraception
The advent of reliable contraception—colloquially called “birth control”—was seen 
by some of its greatest proponents as a way to liberate women: to give them control 
over their lives by freeing them from the shackles of continual pregnancy and the 
consequences of rape. More generally, contraception allows women to invest in edu-
cation rather than cosmetics, which is good for them, and for society. But some of 
birth control’s most famous proponents also saw the potential for it to have eugenic 
effects, since it allows women to decide who fathers their children, and when to have 
children. Contraception, in other words, allows women to have sex for fun, but to 
carefully decide when and how and with whom to have children.
According to Margaret Sanger, founder of Planned Parenthood, “Birth Control…
means not merely the limitation of births, but the application of intelligent guidance 
over the reproductive power. It means the substitution of reason and intelligence for 
the blind play of instinct” (1922, ch. 2). Without contraception, Sanger feared, civi-
lization “will be faced with the ever-increasing problem of feeble-mindedness, that 
fertile parent of degeneracy, crime, and pauperism” (1922, ch. 4). While Sanger’s 
14 Whether we describe an action as “promoting social welfare” or “not reducing social welfare” 
depends on where we draw the baseline. The baseline problem suggests that we cannot come up with a 
simple answer in distinguishing “making better” and “not making worse.” In thinking about whether we 
are promoting welfare or preventing harm it is always worth asking, “compared to what?”.
13 Versions of these principles can be found in recent work on the ethics of reproduction. See Dan Brock 
(2005), and David Benatar (2011). Many critics of eugenics have been so concerned with condemning 
past policies, that they often fail to distinguish moral principles from empirical claims (Buchanan 2007). 
This has led to moral grandstanding and motivated reasoning among its critics, leading many to mini-
mize the importance of genes in shaping personality traits and capacities.
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language is harsh, her point is plausible.15 Contraception can prevent unwanted 
pregnancies, the social consequences of which are borne broadly.16 Since each of 
us has an interest in promoting an environment in which current and future people 
flourish, there are good reasons to make contraception freely available for all. This is 
one of the most cost-effective measures governments can take, and it can be justified 
by its ability to enhance individual autonomy and social welfare.
4.2  Genetic education and counseling
The division of cognitive labor that market society occasions allows us to accumu-
late vast amounts of knowledge, but it also renders people (rationally) ignorant about 
how most things work, including the universe in general, and the human body in 
particular (Hayek 1945). Most people apparently do not want to understand cosmol-
ogy, biology, or genetics. And they don’t need to in order to live reasonably success-
ful lives, even if their success depends on other people knowing little bits about how 
things around them work—like microwave ovens, human kidneys, nuclear power 
plants, internal combustion engines, etc. All of us depend on these things working 
well, and on the ability of experts to repair or replace them when they fail, but very 
few people need to know how any or all of these work.
The problem comes when we bear the costs of other people’s ignorance. In a 
democracy we share the undesirable policy consequences of one another’s ignorant 
or irrational votes (Huemer 2015). And in a society that shares at least some of the 
costs and benefits of productive work, the consequences of people reproducing at 
random are felt by all of us. This suggests that taxpayers should be willing to finance 
genetic testing and the provision of genetic information to prospective parents, with 
the goal of helping them make informed reproductive choices that will benefit their 
children, and protect other people from harm. Since state provision of education 
or information always has the potential to turn into propaganda (Mill 1859, ch. 5), 
there may be reasons to publicly finance its private provision by teachers and doc-
tors in a competitive market. Finally, in addition to education, as genetic engineer-
ing becomes safe and affordable, barriers to accessing socially beneficial genetic 
enhancements should be removed.
15 Sanger’s claim about the link between genes and crime, long ignored or repudiated by academics, 
appears to be borne out to some extent by twin studies. See Barnes et al. (2014).
16 The social consequences of reproductive choices spill across borders and generations. This suggests 
that citizens in wealthy countries have strong reasons to support subsidizing contraception for those in 
poor countries. In particular, the population in most African countries is predicted to explode over the 
next century, and while population growth per se is not a bad thing, it is bad when it occurs in countries 
that rely on Western technology for food and medicine, but that cannot support their own population 
through endogenous economic growth within stable political institutions.
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4.3  Incentives and penalties
The current demographics of Western countries are troubling, as people with a 
higher IQ, more education, and greater income reproduce at relatively low levels. 
Some have suggested paying people who would make good parents to have chil-
dren. But this misunderstands the problem of opportunity cost: most people with 
higher intelligence or more money don’t reproduce less because they can’t afford 
children; they do so because they have many other valuable ways of spending their 
time, including writing books, volunteering, taking exotic vacations, and advancing 
their careers.
States might improve the situation by mandating paid parental leave in the work-
place, so there are fewer costs to temporarily leaving work to take care of children. 
Sweden has among the most generous paid parental leave laws in the world, and it 
is among the few developed countries with a replacement birthrate. Some studies 
suggest that strong family leave laws are the primary reason for its demographic sta-
bility (Hoem 2005). But the evidence is tainted by the fact that native-born Swedes 
have below-replacement fertility, and foreign-born immigrants from Somalia have 
more children, thus bringing Sweden close to replacement levels (Tollebrant 2017). 
This makes the effect of family leave laws a little unclear.
Some authors have suggested paying some people not to reproduce, or instituting 
a parental licensing scheme. Francis Crick tentatively proposed both ideas at a sym-
posium on eugenics (1963, pp. 276, 284).17 In principle, there are reasons to support 
policies like these. But they raise real worries about corruption by bureaucrats, black 
markets for pregnancy, and political legitimacy: in constitutional democracies, con-
troversial policies cannot produce their desired effects over the long run unless there 
is some degree of transparency and public support.
The rationale for any justified licensing scheme is that some activities require 
competence to safely perform, and those who engage in them without adequate skill 
or foresight are likely to seriously harm other people (LaFollette 1980). Some par-
ents lack the desire to take care of their children. This is illustrated by the fact that 
many single mothers sue unwilling fathers for court-mandated child support. Other 
parents abuse their children, or lack the means to provide food, shelter, medical care, 
and education to their children.
The typical response is for the state to step in and pay for all of these things, and 
in extreme cases to remove children from their parents and put them in foster care. 
But it would be more cost-effective to prevent unwanted pregnancies than treating 
their consequences, especially if we could achieve this goal by subsidizing the vol-
untary use of contraception. It may also be more desirable from the standpoint of 
future people.
The most compelling reason (though certainly not a decisive reason) for sup-
porting parental licensing is that traits like impulse control, health, intelligence, and 
17 The conference was attended by other Nobel laureates like Hermann Muller and JBS Haldane, and 
public intellectuals like Julian Huxley whose brother Aldous wrote the eugenic dystopia Brave New 
World.
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empathy have significant genetic components.18 What matters is not just that some 
parents are unwilling or unable to take care of their children; but that in many cases 
they are passing along an undesirable genetic endowment.
As John Stuart Mill argued:
It is not in the matter of education only, that misplaced notions of liberty pre-
vent moral obligations on the part of parents from being recognised, and legal 
obligations from being imposed… The fact itself, of causing the existence of 
a human being, is one of the most responsible actions in the range of human 
life. To undertake this responsibility—to bestow a life which may be either a 
curse or a blessing—unless the being on whom it is to be bestowed will have 
at least the ordinary chances of a desirable existence, is a crime against that 
being (1859, ch. 5).
Mill expressed ambivalence about imposing coercive laws on parents, but was clear 
that policies requiring prospective parents to demonstrate their ability to care for 
children “are interferences of the State to prohibit a mischievous act—an act injuri-
ous to others, which ought to be a subject of reprobation, and social stigma, even 
when it is not deemed expedient to superadd legal punishment” (1859, ch. 5).
For a parental licensing scheme to be fair, we would need to devise criteria that 
are effective at screening out only parents who impose significant risks of harm 
on their children or (through their children) on other people. This is hard enough. 
It would be even more difficult to select appropriate penalties to impose on those 
who fail a reproductive licensing test, but have children anyway. One way to enforce 
licensing is to impose fines or other costs on those who have children without a 
license. Despite its unpopularity in many states around the world, American judges 
occasionally order “deadbeat dads” who father children they can’t support to stop 
reproducing, though the order is difficult to enforce, especially since most states lack 
eugenic sterilization provisions. As a rule of thumb, though, states should apply as 
little coercion as possible to facilitate the emergence of future people with traits that 
enable them to thrive.19
18 Scientists distinguish the cognitive and affective components of empathy (the first concerns our abil-
ity to understand other people, especially their emotions, and the second concerns our ability to react 
appropriately to someone else’s emotional states). Both are strongly influenced by genes, and the absence 
of either or both is associated with narcissism, psychopathy, or autism (Baron-Cohen 2012). On the other 
hand, too much empathy can lead to neuroticism and pathological altruism. So there is presumably an 
optimal range of empathy outside of which children are more likely to develop disorders.
19 To the extent that informal social sanctions work, these are preferable to coercive laws. But informal 
sanctions often fail to work well in large and anonymous groups, especially when the costs and benefits 
of our choices are spread thinly, and accrue mainly to future people. This may give us reason to endorse 
more freedom to move between political communities with different rules and norms (Nozick 1974, ch. 
10). But this freedom wouldn’t address the demographic worry that the proportion of people in the world 
making eugenic reproductive choices may be shrinking, which is a problem for distant generations of 
people who share a single planet, if not a single political community.
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5  Conclusion
Public policies cannot create a eugenic utopia. In fact, passing legal mandates 
and licensing requirements is often more dangerous and less effective than rely-
ing on voluntary choice to achieve the same results. It may be desirable to increase 
informed consumer choice by subsidizing contraception and improving access to 
education about genetics and reproductive technology so that people can make con-
scious choices about the characteristics of their children. Changing reproductive 
norms can also go some way in encouraging eugenic choices. For example, as it 
becomes more socially acceptable to use sperm and egg donors, to screen embryos, 
and to use surrogates, the outcome will likely be collectively beneficial. Many peo-
ple who have a visceral fear of these procedures are even more apprehensive about 
genetically modifying embryos. But arguments can change attitudes.
In recent years, influential authors have argued that we have a moral obligation to 
produce children with the best chance of the best life (Savulescu and Kahane 2009), 
and that many opponents of biomedical technology have a discredited teleologi-
cal view of human evolution (Buchanan and Powell 2011). I have offered a guard-
edly optimistic account of how some public policies might increase the extent to 
which our reproductive choices are both individually rational and collectively desir-
able. But I concede that I may be wrong about any of the measures I’ve considered. 
Sometimes the best policy is not to have one.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Inter-
national License (http://creat iveco mmons .org/licen ses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and 
the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
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